Order of the Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service (Rostechnadzor) No. 517 of 11 December 2020
Unofficial translation. Only the Russian original published in the official sources of the Russian Federation has legal force. This translation is provided for reference and does not replace the official document.
1. These Federal Norms and Rules in the field of industrial safety, "Safety Rules for Hazardous Production Facilities of Trunk Pipelines" (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), establish requirements aimed at ensuring industrial safety and preventing accidents and cases of occupational injuries at hazardous production facilities (hereinafter referred to as HPF) of trunk pipelines (hereinafter referred to as TP) and trunk ammonia pipelines (hereinafter referred to as TAP) through which hazardous substances are transported - hydrocarbons in the liquid (oil, petroleum products, liquefied hydrocarbon gases, gas condensate, wide fraction of light hydrocarbons, and mixtures thereof) and (or) gaseous (gas) state, and liquefied anhydrous ammonia (hereinafter referred to as liquid ammonia).
2. The Rules have been developed in accordance with Federal Law No. 116-FZ of 21 July 1997 "On Industrial Safety of Hazardous Production Facilities" (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation, 1997, No. 30, Article 3588; 2018, No. 31, Article 4860).
3. The Rules are intended for application in: (a) the development of technological processes and the design, construction, operation, reconstruction, technical re-equipment, overhaul, mothballing and decommissioning of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP; (b) the manufacture, installation, adjustment, maintenance, diagnostics and repair of technical devices used at HPF of TP and HPF of TAP; (c) the conduct of industrial safety expert review of: documentation for the mothballing, decommissioning and technical re-equipment of a hazardous production facility (hereinafter referred to as the documentation); technical devices; buildings and structures; industrial safety declarations of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP; and safety justifications of hazardous production facilities.
4. These Rules do not apply to the in-plant pipelines of organisations producing and consuming liquid ammonia.
5. The fire safety of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP is ensured in accordance with the requirements of Federal Law No. 123-FZ of 22 July 2008 "Technical Regulations on Fire Safety Requirements" (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation, 2008, No. 30, Article 3579; 2018, No. 53, Article 8464).
6. Site facilities of trunk oil pipelines and petroleum product pipelines that receive, store and dispense oil and petroleum products are subject to the federal norms and rules in the field of industrial safety establishing industrial safety requirements for hazardous production facilities of oil and petroleum product depots. The requirements of these Rules apply to site facilities to the extent not falling within the sphere of regulation of the federal norms and rules in the field of industrial safety establishing industrial safety requirements for hazardous production facilities of oil and petroleum product depots.
7. The development of the technological process, the selection of the process equipment, the type of shut-off valves or shutdown devices and the locations of their installation, and the means of monitoring and emergency protection of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP shall be justified in the design documentation (documentation) by the results of the hazard analysis of technological processes and the quantitative analysis of accident risk carried out in accordance with Chapter XI "Requirements for the Hazard Analysis of Technological Processes and the Quantitative Analysis of Accident Risk on Trunk Pipelines" of these Rules.
8. Packaged equipment and technical devices are used at HPF of TP and HPF of TAP provided that the manufacturer's technical documentation is available and that they comply with the requirements of technical regulations and of these Rules, which is confirmed by a document of conformity with the requirements of technical regulations or by an industrial safety expert review conclusion.
9. When selecting the route of TP and TAP and siting the facilities of the linear part and the site facilities of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP, account shall be taken of the properties of the transported hydrocarbons and the specific properties of liquid ammonia, the natural and climatic features of the construction area, the hydrogeological properties of the soils, and the presence of nearby production facilities and populated areas, transport routes and utility lines that may adversely affect the safety of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP.
10. When designing HPF of TAP, the fluctuations of soil temperature along the route in the hottest month of the year shall be taken into account to establish the heating temperature of the ammonia supplied.
11. The temperature of the liquid ammonia entering the TAP shall be determined by a design solution taking into account the maximum possible soil temperature at the depth of the pipeline.
12. The manner of siting the linear and site facilities of HPF of TP and TAP shall ensure the possibility of performing construction and installation work using lifting and special-purpose machinery, and the possibility of locating storage areas for equipment and construction materials.
13. The following requirements shall be met for HPF of site facilities of TP: (a) with regard to ensuring explosion safety: prevention of explosions and fires of process equipment; protection of process equipment against destruction and maximum limitation of releases of combustible substances from it into the atmosphere in the event of accidental depressurisation; exclusion of the possibility of explosions and fires within the volume of production buildings, structures and outdoor installations; reduction of the severity of the consequences of explosions and fires within the volume of production buildings, structures and outdoor installations; (b) exclusion of the possibility of explosion of the hazardous substances handled in technological processes at the regulated values of the parameters of the technological processes. A set of regulated parameter values shall be determined for each technological process. The permissible range of parameter variation is established taking into account the characteristics of the technological process. The regulated parameter values, the permissible range of their variation and the hydrodynamic pumping modes (for HPF of TAP) are established during the design of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP and shall be subject to control and regulation within the specified range during their operation. (c) the technical characteristics of the automated systems of HPF of TP performing the functions of control and automatic emergency protection (including inertia, measurement range and measurement error) shall correspond to the rate of change and the required range of values of the parameters of the technological process; (d) for newly designed site facilities of HPF of TP: protection of personnel permanently present in the control room (operator rooms) against the effects of a shock wave (injury) in the event of possible accidental explosions at technological facilities, taking into account the destruction zones, and against thermal effects, shall be ensured; uninterrupted functioning of the automated systems of HPF of TP performing the functions of control and automatic emergency protection for bringing technological HPF of TP to a safe state shall be ensured; (e) calculations of the mass of the substance involved in an explosion, the radii of destruction zones and the explosion risk indicators for assessing the protection of personnel shall be carried out in accordance with the federal norms and rules in the field of industrial safety and the models and methods used in the field of risk analysis.
14. The facilities of the linear part and the site structures of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP shall be located at safe distances from other industrial and agricultural facilities, individual buildings and structures, residential, public and business zones and recreational zones, established in accordance with the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation. The facilities of the linear part and the site structures of HPF of TP shall be located taking into account the danger of the spread of the transported liquid hazardous substances and of the toxic cloud formed in possible accidents over the terrain and the prevailing wind direction (according to the annual wind rose) relative to nearby populated areas, facilities and places of mass gathering of people, and the results of the hazard analysis of technological processes and the analysis of accident risk carried out in accordance with Chapter XI "Requirements for the Hazard Analysis of Technological Processes and the Quantitative Analysis of Accident Risk on Trunk Pipelines" of these Rules. Where oil pipelines and petroleum product pipelines are laid at elevations higher than nearby populated areas and industrial enterprises, the design shall provide for distances from them of not less than 500 metres (for pipe diameters of 700 mm and less) and 1000 metres (for pipe diameters over 700 mm) and for technical solutions preventing the product transported through the pipeline from entering the built-up area.
15. When developing the industrial safety declaration of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP, or where deviations related to the safe siting of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP are necessary, the requirements set out in Chapter XI "Requirements for the Hazard Analysis of Technological Processes and the Quantitative Analysis of Accident Risk on Trunk Pipelines" of these Rules shall be taken into account.
16. To ensure prompt resolution of operational tasks and the minimum time for performing work to localise possible accidents, territorial subdivisions and a central control station (hereinafter referred to as the CCS) are provided for in the operating organisation, within the structure of the organisation, depending on the length of the TAP route, the topographical features of the terrain and the administrative-territorial division of the territory through which the route passes.
17. For sections of pipelines of HPF of TAP laid over terrain located at the same elevations as, or higher than, populated areas, buildings and structures, channels shall be provided for diverting ammonia in the event of a spill to places ensuring the safety of the population. When organising and carrying out activities to eliminate the spill, account is taken of the absence of natural barriers and of the geographical, navigational-hydrographic, hydrometeorological and other features of the area of the ammonia spill.
18. In the design documentation (documentation), when developing technological processes and selecting equipment for the facilities of the linear part of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP, all types of loads and impacts arising at the stages of construction, operation and reconstruction, and during the technical re-equipment, overhaul, mothballing and decommissioning of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP, as well as unfavourable combinations thereof that may affect the reliability and safety of the linear part of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP, are taken into account.
19. Loads and impacts shall be determined on the basis of the results of engineering surveys that have received a positive expert review conclusion in accordance with the procedure established by the legislation of the Russian Federation in the field of urban development.
20. When performing calculations for the strength, deformation and stability of pipelines and supporting structures (foundations, supports, bases), the effect on loads of transient processes (non-stationary modes) during product pumping, as well as possible changes in soil properties during the construction and operation of pipelines, shall be considered.
21. Within HPF of TP and HPF of TAP, hazardous sections shall be identified for which the design documentation (documentation) provides for additional measures aimed at reducing the risk of accidents.
22. The technical solutions adopted in the development of the design documentation (documentation) of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP shall ensure the safety of technological processes.
23. Regardless of the laying method (underground, surface or above-ground laying of the linear part of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP), reliable and safe operation of the trunk pipeline shall be ensured taking into account the terrain, soil and natural-climatic conditions.
24. For the most hazardous sections of the facilities of the linear part of trunk pipelines, the design documentation (documentation) shall provide for special safety measures (fulfilment of one or several conditions) reducing the risk of an accident, including: increasing the pipeline wall thickness; increasing the depth of the pipeline; raising the requirements for the protective coating category and the operating modes of electrochemical protection equipment; installing corrosion monitoring systems; using pipes with a protective coating; using concrete coating; using a protective casing (jacket) or protective slabs; using composite reinforcing sleeves; laying in a tunnel; installing additional bunds and protective walls; strengthening the soil (banks); installing diversion systems (channels, ditches); geotechnical monitoring of pipelines.
25. For the linear part of pipelines intended for transporting the wide fraction of light hydrocarbons, the design documentation (documentation) shall provide for special safety measures reducing the risks to the population and operating personnel, including: increasing the pipeline wall thickness; increasing the depth of the pipeline; limiting the pipeline diameter to not more than 400 mm; additional requirements for the pipe metal as regards strength, crack resistance, and resistance of the pipe body to the propagation of ductile and brittle fracture; continuous monitoring of the technical condition of the pipeline based on more frequent in-line inspection work with the elimination of impermissible defects; geotechnical monitoring of pipelines on hazardous sections.
26. For the most hazardous sections of the facilities of the linear part of trunk pipelines intended for transporting liquid ammonia, the design documentation (documentation) shall provide for special safety measures reducing the risks to the population and operating personnel, the principal ones being: the linear part of the trunk pipeline shall be as far away as possible from large cities, transport and industrial hubs, nature reserve and sanctuary territories, mineral deposits and underground sources of drinking water; the establishment of a zone with special conditions for the use of territories (hereinafter referred to as ZSCUT) on both sides of the pipeline axis in accordance with sub-clause 4 of Part 1 of Article 106 of the Land Code of the Russian Federation (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation, 2003, No. 27, Article 2700; 2020, No. 42, Article 6505), as defined in the regulation on the type of ZSCUT approved in accordance with the Land Code of the Russian Federation; the trunk pipeline shall be divided into sections by shut-off valves. The length of each section is justified in the design documentation (documentation) depending on its internal volume and the topographical, geological and other local conditions, and shall be not more than 15 km for a nominal pipeline diameter of up to and including 350 mm and not more than 10 km for a nominal pipeline diameter of up to and including 500 mm; the depth of the trunk pipeline shall be not less than 1.4 metres to the top of the pipe, on marshes or peat soils subject to drainage - 1.7 metres, and in rocky soils and in marshy terrain where there is no passage of motor vehicles and agricultural machinery - 1.0 metres; the depth of the trunk pipeline at crossings of navigable rivers, canals and other water obstacles, from the level of the bed not subject to re-formation to the top of the TAP, shall be not less than 1.4 metres, and on non-navigable rivers - not less than 0.8 metres; in rocky soils outcropping at the bed surface, the value may be reduced to 0.5 metres on non-navigable rivers and to 0.8 metres on navigable rivers, measured from the top of the ballasted pipeline; laying the trunk pipeline on the bed surface without burial shall not be permitted; the laying of the trunk pipeline across large deep-water navigable rivers and reservoirs, in complex soil conditions of the bed of the water obstacles crossed, on bridge crossings and at crossings of undermined territories shall be provided for by the "pipe-in-pipe" method; the arrangement of a river crossing by the "pipe-in-pipe" method shall be leak-tight and shall consist of an outer jacket withstanding the working pressure adopted in the trunk pipeline and made of pipes of equal strength with the working pipeline; a gland seal of special design ensuring the leak-tightness and soundness of the entire system; bank wells protecting the gland seals against damage; and a system for filling the annular space with gaseous nitrogen and pressure switches transmitting, to the automated process control system via the telemetry system, an alarm of pressure rise in the event of damage to the working pipeline; crossings of the trunk pipeline with other pipelines and cables shall be located below those pipelines and cables. The technical solutions for crossings are justified in the design documentation (documentation); continuous leak monitoring.
27. The technical solutions for the linear structures of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP shall ensure compensation of pipeline movements resulting from temperature changes and the effect of internal pressure.
28. On the linear facilities of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP, means of protection against the possible types of corrosion, including external (atmospheric) and underground corrosion, internal corrosion, and corrosion by stray and induced currents, shall be applied in accordance with the operating conditions and service life established by the design documentation (documentation), and activities ensuring the protection of technical devices against the external effects of electrostatic discharges and electromagnetic fields shall be carried out. The design documentation (documentation) shall provide for measures to protect the insulation coatings of the pipeline against mechanical damage (concrete coating, protective casings, lining).
29. The technological processes of pipeline cavity cleaning, diagnostic work and separation of the transported media (substances) shall ensure the safe operation of HPF of TP.
30. The valves and the shut-off valve piping installed at the facilities of the linear part of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP shall enable remote and local (automatic and (or) manual) control of the shutdown of the technological process, both under design operating modes and in the event of an accident or incident, including with account taken of the sectioning of pipeline sections.
31. The means of protection against exceeding the pressure established by the design documentation shall ensure timely pressure relief for the safe conduct of the technological process.
32. Technical solutions for the transport of high-viscosity liquid hydrocarbons are adopted in the design documentation on the basis of a thermal-hydraulic calculation of the pipeline operating mode.
33. The design documentation (documentation) shall define the requirements for pipelines, pipeline valves and connecting parts as regards the working pressure value and the duration of strength and leak-tightness tests.
34. At underwater crossings of water obstacles, the design documentation (documentation) shall provide for the use of technical means preventing the pipeline from floating up.
35. Measures against pipeline flotation, including the use of appropriate technical devices, shall be developed in the design documentation (documentation) where underground pipelines are laid on sections with a high groundwater level and long-term flooding by flood waters.
36. To ensure the safety of the technological process of transporting gaseous or liquefied hydrocarbons on sections of underground pipeline crossings under public railways and motor roads, the design documentation (documentation) shall provide for technical solutions for leak monitoring.
37. For HPF of trunk gas pipelines, the design documentation (documentation) shall provide for safe gas release devices, separated by pipeline valves and rated for the same working pressure as the main gas pipeline.
38. The design documentation (documentation) for HPF of TP and TAP, including the process regulations, shall provide for technical solutions for cleaning the pipeline cavity after construction, reconstruction, technical re-equipment and overhaul, and for removing water after hydraulic testing.
39. The design documentation (documentation) shall provide for information security measures, as well as special technical means resistant to the external effects of electrostatic discharges and electromagnetic fields and ensuring continuous remote monitoring of the process control systems of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP under the relevant operating conditions. Unauthorised access to the automated process control systems and to the shut-off, control and safety valves shall be excluded.
40. The design documentation (documentation) for HPF of TP and HPF of TAP shall provide for safe maintenance and repair of the equipment of the surface facilities of the linear part of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP.
41. The design and location, on the linear part of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP, of the stations for launching, receiving and passing cleaning and separation devices and in-line flaw detection devices shall ensure the passage of those devices along the entire length of the pipeline.
42. The design documentation (documentation) for the pumping and gas compressor units of pumping and compressor stations shall provide for technical solutions taking into account the compensation of temperature, dynamic and vibration loads. At the site facilities of HPF of TP and TAP, means of protection against the possible types of corrosion, including external (atmospheric) and underground corrosion and corrosion by stray and induced currents, shall be applied in accordance with the operating conditions and service life established by the design documentation (documentation).
43. Equipment and pipeline valves installed without shelter (in the open air) shall ensure the safe operation of HPF of TP in the climatic region of their application.
44. Intermediate pumping stations along the TAP route shall be sited on the basis of a hydraulic calculation, taking into account the equality of hydraulic gradients and the ability of the pipeline to operate at reduced capacity when any of the intermediate pumping stations is shut down.
45. Pumping stations of HPF of TAP located at a distance of less than 2000 metres from buildings and structures shall be positioned at lower elevations relative to those facilities.
46. Head pumping stations of HPF of TAP may be located on the site territory of organisations producing (supplying) ammonia, in accordance with the design documentation (documentation).
47. The design and arrangement of the equipment, pipelines and the monitoring and control system shall enable monitoring of their technical condition in accordance with the process regulations for their operation and maintenance.
48. To monitor gas contamination of the air in the explosion-hazardous zones of production premises, as well as on the open areas of loading and unloading racks and on the open areas with tenders of berthing structures, automatic remote continuous gas monitoring equipment shall be provided, with an alarm actuating when maximum permissible values are reached and sending signals to the control system of the relevant technological process, which performs the corresponding automatic emergency protection. The installation locations and the number of automatic sensors or sampling devices of automatic air gas contamination analysers shall be determined in the design documentation (documentation) taking into account the requirements of the regulatory technical documents of the manufacturing organisations concerning the placement of automatic sensors or air gas contamination analysers.
49. The design documentation (documentation) shall provide for protection of the equipment and pipelines of site facilities against excess pressure, including in the event of hydraulic shock.
50. The siting of intermediate pumping stations immediately upstream of crossings of rivers, canals and bodies of water used for domestic drinking water supply, of fishery significance or navigable, at the locations of hydraulic engineering structures and of bridges carrying traffic and people, shall not be permitted.
51. The head and intermediate pumping stations of HPF of TAP shall be equipped with multi-stage centrifugal sealed pumps for liquefied gases. The selection of pump units is justified in the design documentation (documentation).
52. To maintain the continuity of ammonia pumping at the maximum capacity justified in the design documentation (documentation) for the TAP, a reserve of pumps is determined when calculating their number.
53. The pressure regulation method applied shall ensure the operation of pumping stations at a pressure maintained within the limits established for them in the design documentation (documentation). The pressure regulation and overpressure protection systems shall continuously monitor the pressure at the outlet of pumping stations and prevent the regulated value of the outlet pressure from being exceeded.
54. The equipment, pipes, pipeline valves, flanged joints and fittings used on the suction and discharge lines of compressor stations shall ensure their safe operation at the maximum design discharge pressure.
55. The design documentation (documentation) shall provide for the possibility of shutting down each gas compressor unit of a compressor station by means of shut-off valves with a remotely controlled actuator.
56. Compressor stations shall have systems for the safe release of gas from safety valves and from drain and purge lines. Interconnecting the systems of purge lines, release lines and lines releasing gas from safety valves shall not be permitted. The need to install a separator for removing the liquid phase and mechanical impurities on the release lines shall be justified in the design documentation (documentation). The gas release systems shall ensure safe conditions for gas dispersion taking into account local climatic conditions, including the wind rose.
57. Ammonia pumping stations shall have safe systems for the release of ammonia from the pre-valve, drain and purge lines, justified in the design documentation (documentation).
58. At compressor stations, provision shall be made for purging gas pipelines and equipment with inert gas (steam).
59. A compressor station shall be equipped with a system (devices) for capturing liquid and mechanical impurities.
60. The process equipment of a gas distribution station, up to and including the outlet valve, shall be rated for the working pressure of the incoming branch gas pipeline, except where gas pressure regulators with a shut-off device (shut-off valve and regulator) are used and an additional safety valve is installed upstream of the valve assembly at the outlet of the gas distribution station in each pressure reduction line.
61. The design documentation (documentation) shall provide for the protection of the buildings, structures and outdoor installations of the site facilities of HPF of TP and HPF of TAP against atmospheric electricity (lightning protection). The lightning protection of block valve stations and of site facilities with surface equipment not fitted with breather valves or safe gas release devices may be ensured by connection to the earthing loop.
62. When selecting explosion-protected electrical equipment, the classification of explosion-hazardous zones established by the technical regulations of the Customs Union "On the Safety of Equipment for Operation in Explosive Atmospheres", approved by Decision of the Customs Union Commission No. 825 of 18 October 2011 (official website of the Customs Union Commission http://www.tsouz.ru/, 21 October 2011), shall be followed. <1> The classes and dimensions of explosion-hazardous zones shall be determined and specified in the design documentation (documentation). ——————————-- <1> As amended by Decisions of the Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission No. 250 of 4 December 2012 (official website of the Eurasian Economic Commission http://www.tsouz.ru/, 5 December 2012), No. 73 of 13 May 2014 (official website of the Eurasian Economic Commission http://www.eurasiancommission.org/, 14 May 2014) and No. 119 of 25 October 2016 (official website of the Eurasian Economic Union http://www.eaeunion.org/, 27 October 2016). It is binding on the Russian Federation in accordance with the Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community of 10 October 2000 (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation, 2002, No. 7, Article 632) and the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union of 29 May 2014, ratified by Federal Law No. 279-FZ of 3 October 2014 "On the Ratification of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union" (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation, 2014, No. 40, Article 5310).
63. The layout of pumping stations and tank farms and of the site structures of TAP, the arrangement of equipment and the routing of process pipelines shall ensure the localisation, collection and removal of leaks of hazardous substances.
64. Activities for the construction, reconstruction, technical re-equipment, mothballing and decommissioning of HPF of TP may be carried out only after a positive conclusion of the state expert review of the design documentation or of the industrial safety expert review of the documentation has been received and a permit for the performance of those works has been obtained in accordance with the procedure established by the legislation of the Russian Federation in the field of urban development.
65. At all stages of the work on the construction, reconstruction, technical re-equipment and overhaul of HPF of TP, incoming inspection of structures, products, materials, equipment and technical devices, as well as control of the quality of the work and of all technological operations, shall be organised. The results of the incoming inspection shall be entered in the incoming inspection log, with an inspection report drawn up.
66. Where deviations from the requirements of the design documentation affecting the structural and other characteristics of the reliability and safety of HPF of TP are found, the construction and installation work shall be suspended and the defects found shall be eliminated.
67. When carrying out construction, reconstruction, technical re-equipment and overhaul work at hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines, intermediate and individual tests of the equipment and technical devices shall be conducted.
68. Welding work during the construction, reconstruction, technical re-equipment and overhaul of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines shall be carried out in accordance with the requirements of the regulatory legal acts establishing requirements for welding work at hazardous production facilities.
69. Welded joints made in the course of construction, reconstruction, technical re-equipment and overhaul work at hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines shall be subject to quality control by non-destructive testing methods. The scope and methods of control of the welded joints shall be determined by the design documentation (documentation).
70. The need for reconstruction, technical re-equipment, overhaul, mothballing and decommissioning work at hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines shall be determined on the basis of the results of diagnostic examinations and the assessment of their technical condition.
71. The time frames and methods for reconstruction, technical re-equipment, overhaul, mothballing and decommissioning work shall be determined on the basis of the design documentation (documentation), proceeding from industrial safety requirements and the conditions for ensuring uninterrupted operation of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines.
72. Reconstruction, technical re-equipment and overhaul work shall commence after completion of the preparatory activities, acceptance of the facilities by the contractor and written authorisation of the management of the operating organisation to carry out the work.
73. Before commencing reconstruction, technical re-equipment and overhaul work on the linear structures of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines, the performing authorities shall notify the organisations (owners) operating structures running in the same technical corridor as the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines of the commencement and time frames of the work.
74. Upon completion of construction, reconstruction, technical re-equipment and overhaul, the pipelines of the linear part of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines shall be tested for strength and leak-tightness in accordance with the requirements of the design documentation (documentation). Before being put into operation, the pipelines of the linear part of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines shall be cleaned and examined using in-line cleaning and diagnostic tools (for pipes with a diameter of 300 mm or more). The methods, parameters and schemes for cavity cleaning, in-line diagnostics and testing are established by the design organisation in the design documentation (documentation), the construction organisation plan and the special working instruction on cavity cleaning and strength testing, as well as leak-tightness checking.
75. For hydraulic strength testing and leak-tightness checking of trunk pipelines transporting hydrocarbons, liquid working media (water and other non-combustible liquids) are used; for pneumatic testing, gaseous working media (air, inert gases, natural gas) are used. The use of gaseous working media shall be substantiated in the testing documentation approved by the design or operating organisations. The use of natural gas for testing trunk gas pipelines shall be substantiated in the design documentation (documentation).
76. At negative ambient temperatures, or where it is impossible to provide the necessary quantity of liquid working medium for hydraulic testing, strength and leak-tightness testing of the linear part of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines with gaseous working media may be carried out, with the exception of the most hazardous sections, which shall be tested by the hydraulic method only. The testing method shall be substantiated by the design documentation (documentation).
77. Upon completion of the construction, reconstruction, technical re-equipment, strength testing and leak-tightness checking of a hazardous production facility of trunk pipelines, its integrated trial run shall be carried out.
78. The filling of the linear structures of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines with hydrocarbons or liquid ammonia and its operation for 72 hours after filling are considered the integrated trial run of the linear structure of a hazardous production facility of trunk pipelines. The filling and integrated trial run are carried out in accordance with an instruction (action plan) developed by the operating organisation in accordance with the adopted design solutions.
79. Before the start of commissioning work and integrated trial run work, the operating organisation shall ensure that the workforce of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines is fully staffed in accordance with the staffing table of the operating organisation.
80. Materials and products shall be made of structural materials resistant to the corrosive action of the process medium at the operating parameters.
81. For trunk ammonia pipelines, hot-rolled seamless or welded pipes of killed steel shall be used, with a carbon content of not more than 0.2 per cent, a copper content of not more than 0.3 per cent and a carbon equivalent (the sum of the carbon content and one sixth of the manganese content) of not more than 0.46. The ultimate tensile strength of the pipe metal shall be not less than 4200 kgf/cm2.
82. The relative elongation of the pipe metal on flat transverse five-fold specimens shall be not less than 20 per cent.
83. The impact strength on Mesnager specimens at a temperature of minus 40 C, for a pipe wall thickness of 10 mm or more on transverse specimens measuring 10 x 10 x 55 mm and for a wall thickness of less than 10 mm on specimens measuring 5 x 10 x 55 mm, shall be respectively not less than 3 and 4 kgf/cm2.
84. Seamless pipes shall be made from hot-rolled billets and, for underwater crossings, from machined billets.
85. The use of aluminium, copper, silver, zinc and alloys based on them in any structural elements of trunk ammonia pipelines operating in the presence of liquid ammonia shall not be permitted.
86. For the linear part of trunk ammonia pipelines, steel, cast, forged or welded pipeline valves intended for connection to pipes by butt welding shall be used. At the site structures of hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines, flanged shut-off valves may be used, provided that the nominal pressure of the valves corresponds to the parameters of the working medium in the pipeline and the design of the sealing surface of the flanges is in the form of a raised face for the installation of a spiral-wound gasket. Valves for newly constructed and reconstructed hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines shall be designed to operate at the temperature of the coldest five-day period with a probability of 0.92.
87. In the channel part of crossings over water obstacles, the use of welded bends shall not be permitted.
88. For hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines, after they are put into operation, process regulations for operation shall be developed, defining the procedure for organising the reliable and safe conduct of the process, which shall comply with the design solutions, the operating conditions of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines, the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation in the field of industrial safety and the legislation of the Russian Federation on technical regulation.
89. The process regulations for the operation of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines shall include: the technical characteristics of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines and of the equipment of the site facilities, and the properties of the pumped products (hydrocarbons and liquid ammonia); the process modes of product transportation and diagrams; the procedure for monitoring the leak-tightness (integrity) of the pipelines and equipment of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines; the procedure for detecting leaks; the procedure for monitoring and controlling the process; the procedure for receiving, delivering and accounting for the pumped products; the consumption rates for the main types of raw materials, materials and energy resources; the schematic and process diagrams of the linear part of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines and of the site facilities (graphic part); the condensed longitudinal profile of the linear part of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines (graphic part); the list and characteristics of the most hazardous sections; the passport characteristics of the technical devices used at the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines; the list of mandatory process and production instructions and labour protection instructions with measures to ensure the safe conduct of the process and maintenance, as well as the actions of workers in emergency situations and in the event of incidents; the list of measures to ensure information security; and a section on the safe operation of the production facility.
90. The process regulations shall be revised in the event of changes to the design documentation, industrial safety requirements or the parameters of the process, or in other cases provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation in the field of industrial safety.
91. The operating organisation shall ensure the operation of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines in accordance with the process regulations and the design for the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines, which is prepared in accordance with the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation in the field of industrial safety.
92. The operational, as-built and design documentation shall be kept by the organisation operating the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines.
93. The central control station shall hold the longitudinal profile of the linear part of the trunk ammonia pipeline, drawn up in accordance with the as-built documentation, in which the following are indicated: the diameters, depth-of-burial marks and chainage of the pipeline; crossings over railways and motor roads, water obstacles and ravines; points of intersection with motor roads and railways; points of intersection with underground utilities, the dimensions of the crossing (crossed) utilities and the marks of their burial, sectioning posts and check valves; the locations of stand-alone distribution stations; and the locations of stand-alone electrochemical protection stations and radio masts. The longitudinal profile shall be checked by the operating organisation during scheduled examinations in accordance with the design documentation (documentation).
94. At workplaces, instructions shall be developed in accordance with the process regulations; these are revised once every five years, and also ahead of schedule in the event of amendments being made to the current process regulations or the development of new ones, and also in accordance with a directive of the federal executive body in the field of industrial safety or its territorial body on the elimination of violations of mandatory requirements.
95. In accordance with the design documentation (documentation), the linear part of the trunk ammonia pipeline shall be divided into sections by sectioning posts.
96. Numbers are assigned, in accordance with the design documentation (documentation), to each section of the trunk ammonia pipeline route, each sectioning post and each pumping and distribution station of hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines.
97. Separating shut-off valves on the pipeline shall bear the designation of the number assigned to them, "Open" and "Closed" indicators, and an indication of the flow direction.
98. The above-ground structures and the elements of the trunk ammonia pipeline protruding from the ground shall be fenced.
99. Drains at sectioning posts and check valves shall not be in contact with the soil.
100. The territorial subdivisions of the organisation operating hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines shall have a map on which the following are marked: populated localities; the boundaries of administrative districts and regions; sections of the trunk ammonia pipeline; communication lines; the locations of all above-ground structures of the trunk ammonia pipeline (main sectioning post, check valve, satellite sectioning post, unattended amplification point, distribution station, pumping station); and the boundaries of the trunk ammonia pipeline section served by the territorial subdivision.
101. In the territorial subdivisions, optimal routes for the movement of personnel and machinery to the facilities and sections of hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines shall be developed, approved by the head of the subdivision.
102. To monitor the condition of the linear sections, structures and facilities of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines and to identify factors posing a threat to safety during their operation, constant and periodic monitoring (patrolling) of the linear structures shall be ensured, carried out in accordance with the approved schedules.
103. Various types of patrolling shall be used for patrolling the pipeline route: on-foot rounds, rounds by motor vehicle and aerial patrolling.
104. The frequency and methods of patrolling the route of the linear structures of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines shall be established taking into account the specific operating conditions, the technical condition of the pipelines, the particular features of the pipeline laying section and the natural factors affecting the safety of pipeline operation.
105. For the linear sections and the underwater and bridge crossings, passports, as well as instructions that shall be followed during maintenance and repairs of hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines, shall be drawn up and approved by the technical manager of the territorial subdivision of the trunk ammonia pipeline. The passports indicate information on the permitted operating parameters, the list and technical characteristics of the elements of the trunk ammonia pipeline in the given section (crossing, bridge), including ball valves, check valves, the number of strings of the crossing, "pipe-in-pipe" systems and the design of the bank structures and bridges, as well as the instructions that shall be followed during maintenance and repairs of hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines.
106. Information on the maintenance and repair work performed on the linear sections and the underwater and bridge crossings of hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines shall be entered in their passports.
107. At a pumping station, in addition to the process equipment enabling the process of transporting liquid ammonia to be conducted, to ensure the safety of the process, for newly constructed and reconstructed capital construction facilities, as well as in the case of technical re-equipment of hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines, the following shall be provided: a gas analysis system and a system for monitoring, control and emergency automatic protection (hereinafter - EAP), a drain tank; a flare unit; a propane-butane store; an emergency shower and an eye-wash fountain; communication with the local automatic telephone exchange; and an automatic gas fire-extinguishing system.
108. At stand-alone distribution stations, in addition to the process equipment enabling the process of dispensing liquid ammonia to be conducted, to ensure the safety of the process the following shall be provided: gas analysis, monitoring, control and EAP systems, and a drain tank for receiving drains; a flare unit; a propane-butane store; an emergency shower and an eye-wash fountain; and communication with the local automatic telephone exchange.
109. The underground sections and metal structures of the linear part of the trunk ammonia pipeline, and the pumping and distribution stations, shall be protected against corrosion in accordance with the design documentation (documentation).
110. The insulating coatings of pipelines for protection against soil corrosion shall be made in accordance with the design documentation (documentation) before the hazardous production facility of trunk ammonia pipelines is put into operation.
111. Monitoring of the electrochemical protection parameters and of the protective potential values at the control points of the trunk ammonia pipeline shall be carried out along its entire length.
112. In all areas where stray currents occur and at the points of intersection of the trunk ammonia pipeline with other underground structures, a drainage protection system and a system for equalising their protective potentials shall be provided.
113. The electrochemical protection system shall operate continuously. Electrochemical protection stations may be shut down for repairs in accordance with the instructions developed by the operating organisation on the basis of the design documentation (documentation).
114. Field electrochemical protection installations shall be fenced against access by unauthorised persons and against accidental damage. Warning and prohibition signs shall be posted on the fencing.
115. Passports shall be drawn up for the installations of the electrochemical protection system on the basis of the manufacturers' technical documentation and the as-built documentation of the installation organisation.
116. During maintenance of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines, the scope and frequency of the work performed shall be determined by the design documentation (documentation), the process regulations for the operation of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines, the regulatory and technical documents of the manufacturers for the pipes, materials and equipment, and the results of technical condition monitoring.
117. During operation, monitoring of the technical condition of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines shall be ensured using the necessary technical diagnostics methods, and measures to secure the pipeline at the design elevations in the event of its displacement shall be ensured.
118. The procedure for carrying out and organising maintenance and repair work on technical devices at hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines is determined by the operating organisation taking into account the requirements of the design documentation (documentation) and the regulatory and technical documentation of the manufacturers of the technical devices used at the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines.
119. At the place where repair and gas-hazardous work is carried out, the content of combustible vapours and gases in the air of the working area or premises shall be monitored. Instruments monitoring the content of combustible vapours and gases in the air shall automatically give an alarm at the sampling point. The monitoring frequency shall be specified in the instruction, including mandatory monitoring of the atmosphere before the start of the work and after each break of not less than one hour.
120. In the event that the values of the maximum permissible concentrations for the transported product are exceeded in the air of the working area, repair work is carried out in respiratory protective equipment.
121. At the place where welding and other hot work is carried out, the concentration of combustible vapours shall not exceed 20 per cent of the value of the lower concentration limit of flame propagation. At the place where welding and other hot work is carried out, the concentration of gases shall not exceed 20 per cent of the value of the lower concentration limit of ignition.
122. All changes relating to the construction of facilities of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines and to crossings of the pipeline by utilities of other purposes, as well as structural changes to the linear structures of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines, shall be made in accordance with the design documentation (documentation) and entered in the operational and as-built documentation.
123. To ensure safety, to determine the actual technical condition of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines and the possibility of their further safe operation at the design process modes, to calculate the permissible pressure, to determine the need to reduce the permitted working pressure and switch to reduced process modes or the need for repair with precise localisation of the places where it is to be performed, and to extend the service life of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines, periodic technical diagnostics shall be carried out during operation.
124. The time frames and methods of diagnostics are determined taking into account the hazard and technical condition of the sections of the linear part of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines and of the structures and technical devices of the site structures of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines, as well as taking into account the operational indicators (service life, resource) established by the design and (or) regulatory and technical documentation.
125. On the basis of the results of technical diagnostics, the value of the permitted (permissible) working pressure is determined in accordance with the regulatory and technical documentation for the operation of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines. The document confirming the value of the permitted (permissible) working pressure during the operation of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines is the form confirming the value of the permitted (permissible) working pressure (hereinafter - the form), and for hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines - the passport for the linear section (hereinafter - the passport).
126. The form (passport) is drawn up to confirm the safe value of the permitted (permissible) working pressure during the operation of: (a) facilities put into operation upon completion of construction or reconstruction; (b) existing facilities at which a change in the value of the permitted (permissible) working pressure has been carried out.
127. The form (passport) for hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines shall contain information on the section (section number) of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines and the value of the permitted pressure, as well as information on the need to provide it with safety devices to limit the value of the (permissible) working pressure. The form shall be drawn up before the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines are put into operation.
128. The form (passport), together with the operational and design documentation (documentation), the results of tests, flaw detection and examinations, the pressure diagrams (for liquid media) and the strength calculations on the basis of which the value of the permitted (permissible) working pressure was established, shall be kept in the archive of the operating organisation.
129. The operating organisation shall, throughout the entire life cycle of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines (until their decommissioning), carry out periodic examinations of the pipelines and equipment of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines.
130. The operating organisation establishes the frequency, completeness and procedure of examination and the monitoring methods and means taking into account: data on the construction of the trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines; the technical condition; the operating conditions (duration, process mode); the properties of the product handled; and the particular features of the area of location (the presence of protection zones and of the most hazardous sections).
131. During technical diagnostics of the linear part of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines, the following types of work are performed: in-line flaw detection by passing in-line inspection tools; examination of underwater and overhead crossings over water barriers; external examination, using non-destructive testing methods, of equipment and of sections of the trunk pipelines not subject to in-line flaw detection; and assessment of the condition of the insulating coatings and of the effectiveness of the electrochemical protection means.
132. When determining the frequency, locations and methods of monitoring used during technical diagnostics of trunk ammonia pipelines, the following shall be taken into account: data on the construction of the trunk ammonia pipeline; the design service life of the technical devices and structures; the operating conditions (duration, process modes); data on the operating modes of the electrochemical protection system; data on instrumental checks of the continuity of the insulation of the linear part; information on faults and repairs performed; the characteristics of the most hazardous sections and the particular features of their location; the physicochemical and corrosive properties of the hazardous substances handled; and the data of previous technical diagnostics.
133. During technical diagnostics of the linear part of the trunk ammonia pipeline, the following types of monitoring are used: external flaw detection examination using non-destructive testing means; in-line flaw detection; and assessment of the condition of the insulation.
134. The assessment of the technical condition of the equipment of the site facilities of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines shall include: external examination in the operating mode; and full technical examination with removal from operation (temporary or long-term). Before the examination of equipment with its removal from operation, preparatory operations determined by the operating organisation shall be carried out, which may include, among other things: emptying, cleaning, degassing and the installation of blanking plugs (where necessary).
135. On the basis of the results of the technical examination, a repair schedule (including overhaul) for the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines is drawn up.
136. Process monitoring and control systems shall comply with the design documentation (documentation) and the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation on technical regulation and of these Rules.
137. Process monitoring and control systems shall ensure: maintenance of the specified parameters of liquid ammonia pumping through the trunk ammonia pipeline in accordance with the process regulations; signalling of the equipment status and of the pumping mode parameters; remote control of the ball valves of sectioning posts and signalling of their status; automatic closure of the ball valves of sectioning posts in accordance with the design solutions; local and remote control of the actuating devices of pumping and distribution stations in accordance with the design documentation and the process regulations; and manual or local automatic control of the operation of pumping stations in electrical modules.
138. Enclosed premises (pump modules) in which pumping units are installed, as well as electrical modules in which complex automation, telemechanics and communications equipment is installed, shall be equipped with an automatic fire-extinguishing system, and pump modules also with an ammonia leak detection system with remote signalling to the central control station and to the local control panel.
139. The power supply sources and systems of hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines shall meet the requirements for the arrangement and operation of electrical installations and the requirements of regulatory legal acts in the field of industrial safety.
140. The capacity of the storage batteries for powering electricity consumers in the event of disconnection of the main power supply source shall ensure continuous operation of the remote monitoring, remote control and automation systems for not less than 4 hours and not less than two operations of the shut-off valves at sectioning posts.
141. Putting a complex of hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines into operation in the absence of power supply to the electrochemical protection installation shall not be permitted.
142. Personal protective equipment for personnel shall comply with the requirements of the technical regulation "On the Safety of Personal Protective Equipment" (TR CU 019/2011), approved by Decision of the Customs Union Commission No. 878 of 9 December 2011 (official website of the Customs Union Commission http://www.tsouz.ru/, 15 December 2011). <2> ——————————-- <2> As amended by Decision of the Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission No. 221 of 13 November 2012 (official website of the Eurasian Economic Commission http://www.tsouz.ru/, 20 November 2012), Decision No. 37 of 6 March 2018 (official website of the Eurasian Economic Union http://www.eaeunion.org/, 7 March 2018), Decision of the Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission No. 55 of 28 May 2019 (official website of the Eurasian Economic Union http://www.eaeunion.org/, 31 May 2019) and Decision of the Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission No. 30 of 3 March 2020 (official website of the Eurasian Economic Union http://www.eaeunion.org/, 5 March 2020). It is binding on the Russian Federation in accordance with the Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community of 10 October 2000; the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union of 29 May 2014, ratified by Federal Law No. 279-FZ of 3 October 2014 "On the Ratification of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union".
143. Admission of personnel to the servicing of hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines without personal protective equipment, special clothing and special footwear, or where these are damaged, shall not be permitted and shall comply with the requirements of the labour legislation of the Russian Federation.
144. Operating personnel performing inspection and servicing work at hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines shall have not less than two spare canisters for each filtering breathing apparatus, proceeding from the particular features of the process.
145. To ensure readiness for actions to localise and eliminate the consequences of an accident at hazardous production facilities of trunk ammonia pipelines, an emergency stock of personal protective equipment, in accordance with the list approved by the technical manager of the organisation, shall be kept at pumping and distribution stations, proceeding from the particular features of the process, in an accessible place in sealed cabinets.
146. Production premises shall be equipped with emergency showers and fountains for washing the eyes and rinsing the skin in the event of liquid ammonia coming into contact with the eyes or the skin. The number and location of the showers and fountains are determined in the design documentation (documentation).
147. A container of water shall be kept in the vehicle of the line patrolman.
148. Technical actions for the mothballing and decommissioning of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines are carried out in accordance with the documentation after a positive conclusion of the industrial safety expert review of that documentation has been received, in accordance with the procedure established by the legislation of the Russian Federation in the field of industrial safety.
149. On the basis of the documentation for the mothballing and decommissioning of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines, the operating organisation shall develop a list of organisational and technical actions for the mothballing and decommissioning of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines, the procedure and methods for performing them, the composition and scope of the work, the requirements for fire safety, labour protection, environmental safety and electrical safety, as well as for the documentation of the work performed, including the monitoring procedure, reporting and the time frames for completion of the work.
150. To preserve the serviceability and operability of the equipment of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines, a set of actions for the mothballing of the facility shall be carried out and its maintenance shall be organised.
151. The duration of the period for which hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines are removed from operation and the conditions of their remaining in reserve (mothballing or periodic putting into operation to maintain the operable condition of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines) shall be established by the operating organisation.
152. To establish the procedure for performing the work, organisations operating hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines develop an instruction on the maintenance and repair of mothballed hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines taking into account the requirements established by the design documentation (documentation), regulatory legal acts and regulatory technical documents.
153. To remove hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines from mothballing and put them into operation, a working programme is developed specifying the list of work and the procedure and time frames for its performance.
154. Upon removal from mothballing, inspection, checking, trial running and testing of the pipelines and equipment of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines shall be carried out in accordance with the requirements of regulatory legal acts in the field of industrial safety and regulatory technical documents.
155. Upon removal of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines from mothballing, the operating organisation shall draw up a certificate of putting the facility into service, with the list of work performed attached, after trial operation of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines for 72 hours.
156. All work on the decommissioning of hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines shall be carried out in accordance with the requirements of the documentation for the decommissioning of the hazardous production facilities of trunk pipelines and trunk ammonia pipelines.
157. Before the start of work on the decommissioning of OPO MT and OPO MAP subject to liquidation, work shall be carried out to free the pipelines and equipment of these facilities from hydrocarbons or liquid ammonia. The release into the environment of hydrocarbons in the liquid phase (oil, petroleum products, liquefied hydrocarbon gases, gas condensate, wide fraction of light hydrocarbons, and mixtures thereof) when freeing the pipelines and equipment shall not be permitted. The release of hydrocarbons into the environment in the gas phase when freeing the pipelines and equipment by methods not provided for in the design documentation (documentation) for the liquidation of the OPO MT shall not be permitted.
158. After completion of the work on the liquidation of OPO MT and OPO MAP, the vacated territories shall be reclaimed.
159. The planning and implementation of actions to prevent possible accidents and to ensure constant readiness for the localisation and elimination of the consequences of an accident at OPO MT and OPO MAP is assigned to the operating organisation and includes: establishing an organisational structure with a distribution of duties and responsibility between technical services and officials; developing the necessary documentation (programmes, plans, orders, regulations, instructions) governing the procedure for workers' actions in the event of an accident; monitoring the condition of technical devices; providing collective and individual protective equipment; providing systems and means of observation, warning and communication and ensuring their normal functioning; organising a system of continuous training and preparation of workers (including training and drill sessions) for actions in the event of an accident; forming the necessary financial means and material resources for the localisation and elimination of the consequences of accidents.
160. In the operating organisation, work shall be organised on the continuous preparation of workers in the prevention of accidents, as well as in the actions in the event of an accident provided for in the plans of actions for the localisation and elimination of the consequences of accidents developed in accordance with the requirements of the Regulations on the Development of Plans of Actions for the Localisation and Elimination of the Consequences of Accidents at Hazardous Production Facilities, approved by Government Resolution No. 1437 of 15 September 2020 (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation, 2020, No. 38, Article 5904).
161. For linear and site facilities of OPO MT and OPO MAP, the operating organisation shall, in the plan of actions for the localisation and elimination of the consequences of accidents, determine the actions of personnel to prevent accidents and, if they occur, to localise them and reduce the severity of the consequences to the maximum extent, and also reflects information on the technical systems and means used in doing so.
162. The structural subdivisions of the organisation (branches) shall have reserves of material resources for the localisation and elimination of the consequences of accidents. The reserve of material resources shall be stored in the places established by the operating organisation, and its use for other than its intended purpose shall not be permitted.
163. In the event of a threat of an accident and the possible emergence of a risk of harm to the population, the operating organisation shall take measures to survey the OPO MT and OPO MAP to determine their actual condition and, where necessary, restrict the operating mode or suspend the operation of the OPO MT and OPO MAP.
164. In the operational subdivisions, services of emergency recovery crews and non-staff emergency rescue formations shall be established and staffed.
165. In the operational subdivisions of the MAP, diagrams and maps of the MAP route and route maps indicating the shortest access ways to the main facilities of the route shall be developed and approved by the technical manager of the organisation. Before departing for the accident site, the head responsible for carrying out the work on the localisation and elimination of the consequences of accidents determines the route and order of movement of special machinery and transport vehicles and provides the drivers of the transport vehicles or self-propelled machinery travelling to the accident site with a diagram of the route.
166. During flood periods, the heads of the territorial subdivisions of the MAP shall know the current situation on the road sections where there are seasonal crossings and on the sections of the MAP route where flooding and washouts are possible. In the absence of accurate information on the condition of the seasonal crossings, not less than two access routes to the accident site on the MAP are selected.
167. The procedure and sequence for eliminating a spill of liquid ammonia shall be determined in the process regulations and in the plan of actions for the localisation and elimination of the consequences of accidents.
168. For emergency and repair work on the MAP, an emergency stock of pipes and cable shall be provided. The length of the pipes and cable in the emergency stock shall be not less than 0.2 per cent of the length of the pipeline part and of the cable and shall not decrease during operation by more than 30 per cent of the emergency stock provided for. The places and procedure for storing the emergency stock shall be determined in the operational documentation.
169. To ensure repairs of the MAP, equipment, communication means, instrumentation and automation, power transmission lines, electrical installations and devices, buildings and structures, and also to localise accidents, the territorial subdivision shall have transport vehicles and special machinery in accordance with the calculation of forces and means, as well as with the types of work performed.
170. The scope and content of the technical actions to ensure the safety of the population and the territory along the MAP route are determined in the design documentation taking into account the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation in the field of industrial safety and the legislation of the Russian Federation in the field of civil defence, protection of the population and territories from natural and man-made emergencies, fire safety and the safety of people on water bodies.
171. Actions to ensure the safety of the population and the territory shall be carried out in accordance with plans approved by the technical manager of the organisation operating the OPO MAP, taking into account the requirements established by Article 14 of Federal Law No. 68-FZ of 21 December 1994 "On the Protection of the Population and Territories from Natural and Man-Made Emergencies" (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation, 2002, No. 44, Article 4294; 2020, No. 26, Article 3999).
172. Actions to ensure the safety of the population and the territory along the MAP route shall include: conducting explanatory and preventive work with the population and with organisations using earthmoving machinery and having facilities within the safe distance zone of the MAP; conducting annual information work with the population of nearby settlements on the rules of conduct within the safe distance zone of the MAP and on actions in the event of detecting the smell of ammonia; warning land users and organisations owning utilities that cross the MAP or run in the same corridor with it about the procedure for performing earthworks affecting the safety of its operation and about the mandatory approval by them of earthworks with the organisation operating the OPO MAP; distributing leaflets to the population in all settlements along the MAP route; checking the operability of the local systems for warning the population of danger.
173. Requirements for marking the places of crossings with water bodies, railways and motor roads are established in the instructions developed by the organisation operating the OPO MAP.
174. The operating organisation shall ensure that the residents of settlements located at a distance of up to 2.5 km from the MAP are made familiar with the hazardous properties of ammonia, the simplest methods of protection against it, and the procedure for sending information from the population about noticed leaks of ammonia or about its presence in the air.
175. The operating organisation shall ensure monitoring of the presence of MAP identification signs, signal signs and permanent benchmarks at the places where the MAP crosses water barriers and at the places of crossings with motor roads, and shall take measures to restore them on the ground.
176. The operating organisation shall ensure that the population and settlements located at a distance of 2.5 km from the axis of the MAP are alerted in the event of accidents using the means of the local warning system.
177. In the protected zones of the OPO MAP, the operating organisation shall take measures to prevent the possibility of disruption of the normal operation of the ammonia pipeline, the communication cable and the surface structures.
178. The analysis of hazards of technological processes, quantitative risk analysis and other methods of analysing the risk of accidents associated with the release of transported hydrocarbons are part of the industrial safety declaration, safety justification, risk management and industrial safety management system of the OPO MT and OPO MAP. The analysis of hazards of technological processes, quantitative risk analysis and other methods of analysing the risk of accidents associated with the release of transported products, for existing facilities put into operation before the entry into force of these Rules and not subject to declaration, is carried out upon expiry of the standard (design) service life (operating life), upon extension of the safe operation period, or upon reconstruction or overhaul of the trunk pipelines.
179. When conducting a risk analysis of an OPO MT, the following are taken into account: the explosion and fire hazardous and toxic properties of the transported product; the structural and technological parameters of the technical devices, buildings and structures forming part of the OPO MT; external anthropogenic impacts (including those from neighbouring facilities, crossings with transport routes, possible unauthorised tie-ins into the pipeline and sabotage); possible manifestations of internal and external corrosion; possible deviations of technological parameters from the regulated values; the indicators of mechanical safety (resistance to loads and impacts) and reliability of the OPO MT and of the technical devices used at the OPO MT (the strength characteristics of the material, the pipe wall thickness, the manufacturing and transportation technology and the storage conditions during construction); structural and technological safety measures (protection against overpressure, including against water hammer, measures to prevent hydrate formation on gas pipelines, the effectiveness of leak detection and telemechanics systems, the possibility of loss of stability of the pipeline position, fire barriers); external natural impacts (earthquakes, landslides, soil condition, icing, other hydrometeorological, seismic and geological hazards); the impacts of possible environmental consequences during the construction, operation, reconstruction, technical re-equipment, overhaul, mothballing and liquidation of the OPO MT, including pollution of the environment and disturbance of the fertile soil layer, vegetation cover and landscape; the damaging factors of accidents (release (spill) of hazardous substances, scattering of fragments, the pressure impact of a jet of gas or liquid, the air blast wave from an explosion, thermal and toxic impacts), destruction of technical devices, buildings and structures, explosion, pollution of the environment; the influence of the consequences of accidents and incidents at the OPO MT on neighbouring production facilities, settlements, water intakes, nature reserves and other environmentally vulnerable sites.
180. When conducting a quantitative risk analysis of an OPO MAP, the following are taken into account: the properties of the transported product; possible deviations of technological parameters from the regulated values; structural and technological safety measures; possible manifestations of internal and external corrosion; the indicators of mechanical safety (resistance to loads and impacts) and reliability of the OPO MAP and of the technical devices used at the OPO MAP; external natural impacts (earthquakes, landslides, soil condition, other hydrometeorological, seismic and geological hazards); external anthropogenic impacts (including those from neighbouring facilities and crossings with transport routes); the impacts of possible environmental consequences during the construction, operation, reconstruction, technical re-equipment, overhaul, mothballing and liquidation of the OPO MAP; the damaging factors of accidents (release of hazardous substances, destruction of technical devices and structures, toxic harm, scattering of fragments, pollution of the environment), as well as the possibility of disturbance of the fertile soil layer and vegetation cover during the localisation of accidents and the elimination of their consequences; the influence of the consequences of accidents and incidents at the OPO MAP on neighbouring production facilities and settlements.
181. The methods of risk analysis at OPO MT and OPO MAP shall be justified in accordance with the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation in the field of industrial safety.
182. The hazard of the functioning of OPO MT and OPO MAP is determined by a set of factors taking into account the technological parameters and technical condition of the OPO MT and OPO MAP, the properties of the pumped hazardous substances, and natural and anthropogenic factors.
183. The main task of risk analysis is to provide officials taking decisions on ensuring safety with information on the most hazardous processes and sections of the OPO MT and OPO MAP.
184. When selecting the methods for analysing the risk of accidents, the following shall be taken into account: the stages of the facility's functioning (design, operation, reconstruction, technical re-equipment, overhaul, mothballing and liquidation), the purposes of the analysis of the risk of accidents (for example, justification of safe distances to neighbouring facilities), the type of the OPO MT and OPO MAP analysed, the criteria of permissible accident risk, and the availability of the necessary information.
185. When developing the design documentation (documentation) of an OPO MT or OPO MAP, to justify accident prevention measures, an analysis of hazards of technological processes shall be conducted, with determination of deviations of technological parameters from the design (regulated) values, with a description of the possible causes and consequences of these deviations and an indication of the safety measures taken or planned. The analysis shall include a description of the possible causes and consequences of these deviations, with an indication of safety measures and recommendations for further actions or for improving safety.
186. When modelling an accidental release and the spread of ammonia in the surrounding space, the parameters of the outflow of ammonia shall be taken into account, including the size of the defect opening, the pressure in the pipeline, weather conditions, safety measures, the parameters of the leak detection system, the terrain, natural obstacles, and also the ability of ammonia to form a heavy gas cloud with air.
187. The ammonia outflow model is based on a system of equations of one-dimensional motion of a compressible medium. The motion of the medium along each section is described by the following one-dimensional non-stationary equations for a flow averaged over the cross-section: law of conservation of mass: , (1) where A is the cross-sectional area of the pipeline, m2; t is time, s; is the total density of the mixture, kg/m3; w is the velocity of the medium, m/s; x is the spatial coordinate along the pipeline axis, m; Mo(x, t) is the release flow rate, kg (m x s); law of conservation of individual phases (m = 1 for the liquid phase, m = 2 for the flashed gas phase): , (2) where is the rate of disappearance (appearance) of the liquid (gas) phase as a result of flashing; Ym is the mass fraction of the liquid (gas) phase. law of conservation of momentum: , (3) where Io(x, t) is the momentum loss in the system upon release of the medium, kg/s2; is the friction coefficient; g is the acceleration of gravity (9.81 m/s2); D is the pipeline diameter; is an auxiliary coefficient, , where is the exponent of the power-law dependence of the wind speed on height; law of conservation of energy: , (4) where is the specific internal energy (per unit mass), J/kg; Eo(x, t) is the energy loss in the system upon release of the medium, J/(m x s); Q is the specific (per unit mass) rate of change of energy due to the phase transitions occurring in the system, J/(m3 x s); is the heat exchange with the environment through the pipe walls, J/(m x s). The corresponding terms describing heat exchange with the environment, wall friction, losses at local resistances and the flashing fraction are calculated according to the available data.
188. The heavy gas model takes into account the following processes: movement of the cloud taking into account the change in wind speed with height; gravitational spreading of the cloud; dispersion of the cloud in the vertical direction due to atmospheric turbulence (entrainment of air into the cloud); dispersion of the cloud in the horizontal direction due both to atmospheric turbulence and to gravitational spreading (entrainment of air into the cloud); heating or cooling of the cloud due to the entrainment of air; phase transitions in the cloud (gas-liquid and liquid-gas); heat exchange of the cloud with the underlying surface. When calculating the dispersion of ammonia, the drift from a continuously operating source (from the ammonia pipeline) shall be analysed. The distribution of the ammonia concentration in the cloud is described by the following relationships: ; (5) . (6) At , where is the concentration of the hazardous substance at a certain point at a certain moment of time during the dispersion of the secondary cloud formed at the 1st stage of entry of the hazardous substance into the atmosphere under the i-th scenario, kg/m3; is the concentration of the hazardous substance at the centre (on the axis) of the cloud at a certain moment of time during the dispersion of the secondary cloud formed at the 1st stage of entry of the hazardous substance into the atmosphere under the i-th scenario, kg/m3; z is the elevation mark of the pipeline, m; y is a spatial variable (the coordinate perpendicular to the wind direction), m; x is a spatial variable (the coordinate along the wind), m; is the coordinate of the rear edge of the secondary cloud formed at the 1st stage of entry of the hazardous substance into the atmosphere under the i-th scenario, m; is the coordinate of the front edge of the secondary cloud formed at the 1st stage of entry of the hazardous substance into the atmosphere under the i-th scenario, m; is the vertical dispersion during the dispersion of the secondary cloud formed at the 1st stage of entry of the hazardous substance into the atmosphere under the i-th scenario, m; is the half-width of the core of the secondary cloud formed at the 1st stage of entry of the hazardous substance into the atmosphere under the i-th scenario, m; is the horizontal dispersion during the dispersion of the secondary cloud formed at the 1st stage of entry of the hazardous substance into the atmosphere under the i-th scenario, m. To determine the spatial distribution of the concentration (in fact, of the variable quantities included in formulas (5) and (6), the profile of which is set by formulas (5) and (6), the following equations are used. conservation of the mass of the released ammonia qil: , (7) where is the effective half-width of the secondary cloud formed at the 1st stage of entry of the hazardous substance into the atmosphere under the i-th scenario, m; is the effective height of the secondary cloud formed at the 1st stage of entry of the hazardous substance into the atmosphere under the i-th scenario, m; is the effective velocity of movement of the secondary cloud formed at the 1st stage of entry of the hazardous substance into the atmosphere under the i-th scenario, m/s; change in the flow rate of the total mass of ammonia and air in the plume : , (8) where is the rate of entrainment of air into the cloud due to diffusion in the vertical direction, m/s; is the proportionality coefficient in the calculation of the air in the cloud entrained through the lateral surface (equal to 0.63); gravitational spreading of the cloud: (9) lateral dispersion of the release due to atmospheric diffusion: (10) (11) conservation of energy in the cloud : , (12) where evozd is the specific internal energy of the entrained air, J/kg. The position of the front edge of the ammonia cloud is determined by the formulas: (13) The position of the rear edge is determined by the formulas: (14)
189. To justify other models, calculation methods and computer programmes, including foreign ones, the following shall be indicated: the organisation that developed them, the calculation models adopted, the values of the main input data, literature references to the materials used, including information on the verification (certification) of the computer programmes, including foreign ones, and on comparison with other models and with actual data from accident investigations and experiments, and data on the practical use of the methodologies and computer programmes, including foreign ones, for other similar facilities.
190. To forecast the largest-scale chemical contamination, the most hazardous accident scenarios are determined, under which the maximum dimensions of the impact (damage) zone are possible: a scenario involving the complete destruction of a vessel (process, storage, transport or other) containing hazardous substances in the maximum quantity; a scenario of a "guillotine" rupture of the pipeline with the maximum flow rate and the maximum duration of the release; meteorological conditions: atmospheric stability class F, wind speed at a height of 10 m - 1 m/s.
191. When assessing the hazard of toxic harm to people in accidents at OPO MAP, the concentration and duration of the impact of ammonia on a person shall be taken into account. The measure of the impact on a person is the toxic dose Di(x,y,z). This value is obtained by integrating the concentration according to relationship (5) over the time the person remains in the cloud. The nature of the harm to a person is determined by comparison with the threshold and lethal toxic doses. The threshold toxic dose of ammonia is 15.0 mg x min/l, and the lethal toxic dose is 150.0 mg x min/l.
192. The safe distances from the axis of underground pipelines of OPO MT and OPO MAP to cities and other settlements, buildings and structures shall be determined taking into account risk analysis, depending on the pressure and diameter of the pipeline, its length and the terrain, to ensure the safety of the population, explosion safety, fire safety and protection of the environment, taking into account the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation.
193. When selecting the route of a designed (reconstructed) MAP, the safe distances to cities, settlements, buildings and structures are established based on the results of calculation.
194. In the quantitative assessment of the risk of accidents, the initial specific frequency of ammonia release on the linear sections of an OPO MAP is taken as a frequency value not less than the corresponding specific frequency of accidents on the linear part of trunk pipelines. The results of the analysis of the risk of accidents at an OPO MAP shall be justified and documented in such a way that the calculations performed and the conclusions can be verified and repeated by qualified specialists who did not participate in the initial procedure of the analysis of the risk of accidents at the OPO MAP.
195. In the development of special documents (an industrial safety declaration, a safety justification, a plan of actions for the localisation and elimination of accidents, documentation support for the industrial safety management system), the results of the analysis of the risk of accidents at an OPO MAP are documented in accordance with the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation.
196. The process of conducting a quantitative analysis of the risk of accidents includes four stages: 1) planning and organisation of the work; 2) identification of accident hazards; 3) quantitative assessment of the risk of accidents at the OPO MT, including: (a) assessment of the frequency of possible accident scenarios; (b) assessment of the possible consequences under the accident scenarios considered; (c) calculation of the indicators of the risk of accidents at the OPO MT; (d) determination of the degree of hazard of sections and components of the OPO MT; (e) ranking of sections and components of the OPO MT by the indicators of the risk of accidents; (f) comparison of the indicators of the risk of accidents of sections and components of the OPO MT with the corresponding average statistical level and establishing the degree of hazard of the sections and components of the MT; 4) development of recommendations for reducing the risk of accidents.
197. When analysing the results of the calculations for the sections and components of an OPO MT, a comparison of the calculated risk indicators with the average statistical level of the risk of accidents is carried out. For sections of the linear part of an OPO MT, the degree of hazard of accidents is determined on the basis of the difference between the value of the accident risk indicator calculated for the section and the average statistical level of the risk of accidents. The average statistical level of the accident risk indicator is determined from data on the investigation of accidents at similar facilities. The calculations are carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Rules and the most accurate models and methods in the field of the analysis of the risk of accidents.
198. The results of the assessment of the degree of risk of accidents at OPO MT shall be justified and documented in such a way that the calculations performed and the conclusions can be verified and repeated by qualified specialists who did not participate in the initial procedure of the assessment of the degree of risk of accidents at the OPO MT.
199. The process and results of the work on the quantitative analysis of the risk of accidents at an OPO MT shall be documented in the form of a report on the analysis of the risk of accidents at the OPO MT (except for the industrial safety declaration). The report on the analysis of the risk of accidents at the OPO MT shall include: a title page; a list of the persons who performed the work, indicating their positions (if any), academic titles (if any) and the names of their organisations; a table of contents; a description of the OPO MT analysed; the methodology, initial assumptions and limitations defining the limits of the accident hazard analysis; a description of the hazard analysis methods and models of accident processes used and justification of their application; the input data and their sources, including the necessary data on accident and injury rates at the OPO MT and on equipment reliability; the results of hazard identification; the results of the assessment of the indicators of the risk of accidents and of the degree of hazard of the sections and components of the OPO MT; an analysis of the influence of the input data on the results of the quantitative risk assessment; recommendations for reducing the risk of accidents; a conclusion; a list of the information sources used.
200. The results of the quantitative risk analysis shall be taken into account when justifying the safe distances between buildings and structures located on the territory of an OPO MT and neighbouring facilities, including for justifying the degree of protection of people in buildings. The calculation is carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Rules, as well as with models and methods in the field of the analysis of the risk of accidents, taking into account the following provision: the criteria of safety and of permissible (acceptable) risk are justified in the design documentation (documentation) or the industrial safety declaration of the OPO MT, or are established in the safety justification of the hazardous production facility, based on the condition that the individual risk of fatality of personnel in accidents does not exceed the average statistical values of the individual risk of fatality of people in man-made incidents (the background risk of mortality from unnatural causes).